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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As amplified below, Erin's argument on appeal suffers
from several substantive infirmities:
•

Contrary to Erin's suggestion, this is not a
case involving any retroactive application of
the law.
On remand, the trial court was
ordered to review the evidence leading to the
alimony award and make more detailed findings.
The trial court expressly found that it had
miscalculated the spousal maintenance for the
first three years and that Tom had overpaid
Erin by $108,000.00. The issue is whether the
record
substantiates
the trial
court's
rationalization for allowing Erin to keep that
windfall — not whether evolving principles of
common law should be given retroactive effect.

•

Under the applicable standard of review for
alimony awards, the Court must affirm as long
as there is evidence in the record which
reasonably
supports
the
trial
court's
determination of living expense need. Erin
cannot simply "wish away" the corroborative
exhibits and testimony at trial, by arguing
that she would have used a different strategy
for calculating her expenses if she had
realized then that she wasn't legally entitled
to get a cut of Tom's future income as part of
her property settlement. The notion that she
was wrongfully denied the opportunity to
relitigate the issue of her living expense
need is specious: This Court remanded the
case for more detailed findings on the alimony
award — not for a new trial.

•

Erin cannot be permitted to reargue that the
alimony award should be altered so that the
parties future incomes are "equalized." That
is not the purpose of spousal maintenance, as
this Court determined in the first appeal.

•

Finally, Erin misconstrues the legal elements
of alimony awards and attorneys' fees awards
in dissolution actions.
In each case, the
responding spouse's ability to pay is a factor
which comes into play only after the
petitioning spouse's actual financial needs
have been established. At that point, it may
1

be a reason for limiting the final award; and
it is never used as a basis for increasing an
award above the petitioning spouse's actual
financial needs.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court's Decision to Reduce Erin's Alimony is
Supported by the Evidence and by Adequate Findings.
The trial court originally

awarded Erin alimony of

$10,000 per month for the first three years, to be reduced to
$5,000 per month for the next three years, after which alimony
would terminate.
this

Court

R.O.A. 382-383, 402.

held

that

the

trial

In the first appeal,

court's

findings

were

insufficient and remanded the case so the trial court could
specifically address Erin's employability, the justification
for reduction in alimony, and Tom's ability to pay.

Chambers

v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992). In addition,
this

Court

directed

the

trial

court

to

reconsider

the

inclusion of the children's expenses in the alimony award,
something which is described as "plainly inequitable" to Tom.
Id. at 843, n.l.

On remand, after making the additional

findings based on certain evidence in the record, the trial
court recalculated the alimony and concluded that it should
have originally been $7,000 per month for the first three
years, and reduced to $3,000 per month after that.
732, 923-924, 929.

R.O.A.

Erin has appealed that part of the Order

on Remand, on the grounds that there was "no reasonable basis"
for reducing the alimony and that the order was "not supported

2

by adequate findings."

Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at

19, 29, 33.
As the record shows, the trial court's Order on Remand
decreasing

the

alimony

adequate findings.

was reasonable

and

supported

by

In its Order on Remand, the trial court

made the following Findings of Fact:
3.
In reconsidering the alimony award in the
original Decree, it occurs that there were
miscalculations.
4.
Plaintiff's
Exhibit
11
correctly
reflected the needs of the plaintiff and her
children at about $10,000.00 per month.
That
amount failed to consider her additional need of
health and accident insurance (previously provided
by the defendant) and money to offset her tax
liability for her receipt of alimony.
5.
The
Court
recognized
there
were
substantial children's expenses involved in the
Exhibit 11 needs assessment, but those expenses
would be approximately offset by the fact that the
child support nearly equalled the amount of
children's expenses alleged on Exhibit 11 and the
$4,500.00 child support was included in the income
calculations.
6.
In recalculating the alimony, if the
Court accepts the expenses of Exhibit 11 and adds
the expenses of health and accident insurance and
taxes on the alimony paid and then deducts the
child support, that means the plaintiff has need of
about $7,000.00 to maintain her prior standard of
living.
7.
The estimated $7,000.00 for the plaintiff
to maintain her prior standard of living does not
factor into any consideration of the plaintiff's
ability to provide for herself or money received as
returns on investments from assets awarded to her
as part of the property division.

10. Plaintiff was thirty years of age at the
time of trial. She testified that she had two and
3

one-half years of college and that she held certain
jobs previously, including teaching dancing,
working in window display and as a clerk at ZCMI
and a clerk at Stop & Shop. She also testified she
helped manage some apartments.
Plaintiff also
testified that she had not made any attempts to
obtain any employment outside of the house. The
evidence also showed that plaintiff participated in
many types of physical activities and there were no
reasons, health or otherwise, why plaintiff could
not be fully employed and contribute to her own
needs.
Plaintiff could have found appropriate
employment which would provide at least a minimum
wage income of $736.00 to assist in providing her
own needs.

13. The Court figures with a four percent
return on her investment base, the imputed income
of $736.00 and the child support, the alimony
should be reduced at the end of three years to
$3,000.00 per month.
R.O.A. 923-926 (emphasis added).
The foregoing findings set forth a "reasonable basis" for
the trial court,s recalculation of the alimony award for the
first three years and reduction of alimony thereafter.

They

are adequate under the law because they are "sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue
was reached."
App. 1988).

Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah
Erin cannot overturn them simply because she

disagrees with the way in which the evidence was weighed.
However, the trial court did exceed the mandate of this
Court when it reversed itself (without any evidentiary basis)
and ordered that alimony would not terminate after six years.
See Appellants Brief at 17-24.
4

On remand, the trial court

should have limited itself to further explaining its original
order reducing alimony and its reference to the "substantial
income

from

"Further

nsset s

liidi

explanation"

nothing more.
I ri 11o1

nave

was

been

what- ^ i «

Chambers, 840 P.2d
t\ i"i s w ti i: i nq

awarded
Court

to
had

[Erin]."
mandated,

843.

b r 1.1 .

u aoes not

oppose

Tom' s

argument (or supporting legal authority) that the trial court;
exceeded its jurisdiction on remand on this issue.
Erin

does

Abold's

not

root radirt

testimony

about

Tom'1*

Moreover,

(

*1 'it eroents that:

Erin's net

investment

(1) Mr'.

income was

unopposed at trial; (2) Mr. Abold's calculations already took
into consideration the taxes on Kriiv's Investment base; (3)
there was no evidence of a 4% rate of return; and (4) there
*

evidence that the family loans were uncollectible.

Thus,

the

indefinitely

trial
has

coui t. * i:
been

order

shown

to

extending

be based

the

alimony

completely

upon

unsubst diitiated and unproven assumptions outside the record.
When the trial court corrected JIs mistake on the alimony
calculation, and determined that alimony should have been
instead of $10,000 per mont;

became

apparent that Erin had received an overpayment

ry

totalling $108,000 plus interest.

The issue before the court

wa i lint whel her to make the reduction in the award for the
first three years prospective — three years had a.l ready passoii
by the'4'
deal w

T^e issue, in Judge Taylor's own words, was how to
> <

: . :

s ^iue,
5

-J overpayment [to

Erin]" and whether "[t]o require plaintiff to repay those
overpayments . . . ."

R.O.A. 766-67 (quoted at page 15 of

Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief).

Tom appealed from the

decision not to order such repayment.

See Appellant's Brief

at 11-17.
Erin has presented

no

legal, factual

or

equitable

justification which supports the trial court's decision to let
her keep the overpayments.
Brief

at

35-38.

Erin

See Appellee/Cross-Appellant's
implicitly

concedes

that

the

overpayments are Tom's post-decree separate property to which
she has no legal claim. The trial court expressed the feeling
that repayment would "somehow seem unfair," because the family
debts

(part

of

Erin's

investment

base)

were

probably

uncollectible. R.O.A. 766-767, 924-925. By her silence, Erin
concedes that this assumption is absolutely without factual
support in the record. Tom also challenged the trial court's
unsupported conclusion that repayment would seriously affect
Erin's

ability

to maintain

her

standard

of

living

and

undermine her investment base. This was pure speculation, not
supported by logic or any evidence in the record.

Erin has

not shown it to be otherwise.
The "retroactivity" cases cited by Erin are red herrings.
This is not a case where the trial court "retroactively"
applied some change in the common law.

It is a case where,

confronted with the deficiencies of its findings of fact, the
trial court "corrected" certain errors on remand.
6

IT.

Erin is N o t Entitled t o an Increase in t h e A l i m o n y Award,
Erin a r g u e s that "the trial court should h a v e increased

t h e a l i m o n y rather than decreased i t " and r e q u e s t s t h i s Court
to remand t h e case with

direction!1!,. '

f

award that w o u l d p r o v i d e h e r a true and e q u i t a b l e standard of
A p p e l l e e / C r o s s - A p p e l l a n t 7 s Brief at 31, 4 3

living."
arguments

a r e improper.

Erin's

bee a u s e Tom # s

Er I n I n s i s t s t. 11 a t

future c o n t r a c t p a y m e n t s w e r e held not t o be a m a r i t a l asset
subject t o a x v x s x o n , s h e should h a v e received a larger a l i m o n y
award i n t h e i n t e r e s t s of equalizing t h e disparit
T o m ' s p o s t - d e c r e e incomes.

£ d . at 1 9 .

sane ar g umei it wh i ch Erin briefed
appeal

i. her and

T h i s is e x a c t l y t h e

and argued

in t h e first

(See A p p e l l a n t ' s Brief, dated 1 1 / 7 / 9 1 , at 3 0 - 3 9 ) .

It

w a s r e j e c t e d then, see Chambers, 840 P. 2d at 842-43, and t h a t
r e j e c t i o i i i s re s

judicata i i ow

Th I s C on ir t a f f irmed

the

decision that Tom's future contract earnings were not subject
to

division,

reconsuk'i

and

i t d i d not

I he awdi'd of A l i m o n y

direct

the

trial

in light oil that

court

to

holding.

Essentially, Erin is arguing that t h e trial court erred
by r e l y i n g u p o n E r i n ' s own Exhibit 11 to set a l i m o n y b e c a u s e
(a) Kxnilut

n w a s not "the maximum 1

of net support r e q u e s t ,

and (b) It w a s n o t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of h e r m a r i t a l standard of
living. A p p e l l e e / C r o s s - A p p e l l a n t ' s Brief at 26, Erin a s s e r t s
that at trial a n d in the first a p p e a l , s h e Iliad a r g u e d t h a t if
T o m ' s future contract earnings w e r e n o t m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y t o b e
divided, then s h e w o u l d w a n t m o r e alimony.
7

Id. at 19, 2 7 .

However, Erin's trial counsel never put on evidence at trial
of how much additional alimony she was claiming.

At trial,

the issue of division of Tom's future contact earnings was
hotly contested. Erin's trial counsel knew there was a chance
Erin would not be awarded part of Tom's future earnings.
would have been a simple matter
alternative

exhibit

showing

a

It

for him to present an

claim

for

"X"

amount

of

additional alimony.
Erin's trial counsel made a tactical decision not to do
so.

On appeal, Erin's new counsel complains that Exhibit 11

did not reflect her true living expense need and made no
provision for "health insurance/1 "extended travel", "tax
preparation", "expensive gifts for the children", or "real
estate or stock investments."
Brief at 28-30.

Appellee/Cross-Appellant's

First, that is directly contrary to Erin's

testimony that Exhibit 11 was very close (within $500) to the
living expense need for herself and the parties' children.
Tr. II: 105-07.

Second, even if there were deficiencies in

Exhibit 11 and her trial counsel did not adequately present
her proof at trial, Erin has no right to a second bite at the
apple. Third, there was additional evidence presented in the
record from which the trial court could determine the parties'
marital standard of living:

Tom presented evidence that the

entire Chambers family had enjoyed a comfortable standard of
living on an expenditure of approximately $12,000 per month.
Tr. IV: 109-11; Defendant's Exh. 25.
8

Contrar •' to Mr in' s present contention that the trial
court did not consider her need
Exhibit
costs.

tor "health insurance ,tf

clearly requested $736.20 per month for health
Ill inn, in I Im I>I*PICM> I hn trial court ordered:

The defendant shall maintain such health, accident
and dental insurance as is available to him through
his employment for the minor children of the
parties, and shall pay all uninsured medical,
dental, eye care and orthodontic expenses by or on'
behalf of the children.
The defendant shall take all steps necessary to be
certain that the plaintiff is able to secure her
COBRA benefits to health insurance from the NBA for
insurance protection for 36 months after the entry
of this Decree.
All such medical insurance
premiums and expenses shall be paid by plaintiff.
R.O.A. 403-404.

Contrary

present contention that

the trial court die
travel,"

"tax preparation"

;
or

"expensive

gifts

,i
for the

chi ldren," Exhibit 11 clearly requested $3,539.55 per month
for "Clothing, Entertainment, Incident

,

rind an additional

$3 00.00 per month for "Entertainment" and another $1,075.00
per month for "Incidentals."

Travel, income tax preparation

and gifts were specifically listed in the attachments to
Exhibit 11. See Plaintiff7s Exh. 1 2

Furthermore, the court

s t a t c ci i iii 1:1" i • ? D e c r e e i

It is acknowledged that defendant is paying child
support in the amount of three (3) times higher
than the maximum child support amount set forth by
the child support schedule for three (3) children,
and the higher amount is justified in allowing the
children to share in the relative affluence of the
defendant.

9

R.O.A. 403.

Contrary to Erin's contention that the trial

court did not consider Erin's desire to make investments and
create a retirement plan for herself, the trial court was well
aware that, by stipulation of the parties, Erin would receive
$1,497,578 in cash and cash equivalent assets, and would have
an income from the investment of those sums. Tr. IV: 2-3, 3549; Tr. Ill: 93-96; R.O.A. 385-393, 405-410.
Just as she did in the first appeal, Erin argues that the
alimony award should be reversed and remanded with directions
to the trial court to bring into "parity" and "equalize" the
parties'

"future

standard

of

living."

Appellee/Cross-

Appellant's Brief at 28, 30, 34-35 (emphasis added).

Just as

she did in the first appeal, Erin asserts that Howell v.
Howell, 806 P. 2d 1209

(Utah App. 1991) and Martinez v.

Martinez, 818 P. 2d 538 (Utah 1991) support her position.
at 35.
As

Id.

They do not.
Tom

argued

in

the

first

appeal

(Brief

of

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, dated 12/19/91, at 13-20), the true
function of alimony is to permit the receiving spouse to
maintain the standard of living enjoyed during marriage, and
to prevent that spouse from becoming a public charge. English
v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977).

The Supreme Court

has articulated three factors which are to be considered in
deciding whether an award of alimony is justified.
court must consider:

The trial

(1) the financial condition and needs of

the spouse seeking support, (2) the ability of that spouse to
10

generate income, and (3) the abil i ty of the responding spouse
to provide the support,

id. The courts do not use alimony as

a vchichci foi equalizing the* parties' future incomes.
To the contrary, this Court has explicitly staled that
"alimony may not be automatically awarded whenever there is
disparity between the parties1 incomes."

Bur t v. Burt, 799

P. 2d 1166, 1170 (Utah App, 1990) (emphasis added).

In the

Gardner case, Judge Howe explained:
We have said that the wife is entitled to enjoy as
near as possible the same standard of living she
enjoyed during the marriage and she should be
prevented from becoming a public charge. English
v. English. 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). But
this is not the same as "equalizing" their incomes.
The instant case is a good example. Mr. Gardner is
a highly skilled surgeon earning $6,000 per month.
Mrs. Gardner was not employed at the time of the
divorce.
She thought she could maintain the
standard of living to which she had become
accustomed if she received $1,700 per month
alimony.
If their financial positions after
divorce are to be equal, she presumably should have
$3,000 per month alimony.
1 do not think the
majority intends that result ,
The object of divorce is to set the parties free of
each other after an equitable division of property
is made and, if needed, an award of alimony is made
which will enable both parties to maintain as near
as possible the standard of living they enjoyed
during the marriage. The parties then go their
separate ways and attempt to rebuild their lives.
But because of the disparity in their earning
ability, the wife here, who has training as a
secretary but has not been employed for thirtythree years, will never earn as much as her
husband-surgeon. Our cases do not suggest that the
divorce decree should attempt to cure this
disparity by "equalizing" their future incomes.
Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 1083 (Utah 1988) (J Howe,
concu i r J ny i»iid d i ssent i nq) ( emphasis added) .
11

This

traditional

examination

of

the

two-step
expenses

approach

generated

begins
by

with

an

the parties'

lifestyle during marriage and ends with the determination of
whether any amount is needed to supplement the potential
recipient's own income in order to remain "at a level as close
as possible to that standard of living."

See Gardner, 748

P.2d at 1081; Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah
App. 1988); Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App.
1991) .

The goal is maintenance of the status quo, not

ascendancy to new heights.
As Tom pointed out in the first appeal, the Supreme Court
has declined to recognize the equitable restitution approach
which Erin endorses:
The Court of Appeals' concept of equitable
restitution cannot be sustained for three reasons.
First, the concept of equitable restitution is
based on the proposition that a failed marriage is
a venture akin to a commercial partnership in which
the spouses invest their time and effort solely for
remunerative activities . . . In any event, the
spouse's contributions cannot be reduced to a
common denominator that allows for a valid
comparison in monetary terms.
Indeed, the very
attempt to do so would interfere with the trial
court's ability to achieve an equitable result
based on the needs of the spouses in light of the
monetary resources available. For example, if a
spouse avoids his or her marital responsibilities,
the partnership theory might result in denying that
spouse any award of support or property at divorce,
irrespective of his or her need and the other
spouse's ability to pay. That is not the law.
Martinez v. Martinez. 818 P.2d
(emphasis added).

538, 540-41

(Utah 1991)

The Supreme Court emphasized that the

English factors provide an adequate framework from which to
12

fashion an appropriate award of alimony and that the award
must have a relationship to the recipients need, in light of
the standard of living the parties had during the marriage.
Id.
As in the first appeal, Erin again tries to bolster her
"equal income" argument1 with the Supreme Court's statement
that "in some circumstances" it may be appropriate for the
trial court to make a "compensating adjustment" while dividing
marital property and awarding alimony. Martinez, 818 P.2d at
542.

The facts of the present case do not fall within those

limited situations contemplated by the Supreme Court:
The cases which have refused to hold that
professional degrees and practice constitute
marital
property
subject
to
valuation
and
distribution have nonetheless assessed and divided
the value of the degree or practice on the basis of
other legal and equitable remedies. These cases
follow a common fact pattern.
Typically, the
husband is supported throughout a long graduate or
professional program by the working wife, and the
couple is divorced soon after graduation. In such
cases, there are few marital assets to distribute,

1

Erin's position is still essentially based on the factors
rejected by the Supreme Court in Martinez: (1) the length of the
marriage, (2) financial contributions and personal development
sacrifices made by the spouse requesting equitable restitution. (3)
the duration of the contributions and sacrifices during the
marriage, (4) the disparity in earning capacity between the
spouses, and (5) the amount of property accumulated during the
marriage. Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 69, 78 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), rev'd. 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991).
13

and the courts have considered
compensating the spouse.

other ways of

Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1080-81 (cited for illustrative purposes
in Martinez).2
The Utah courts have consistently reversed alimony awards
that appeared to be designed merely to equalize disparity in
the parties' respective income levels rather than providing
supplemental income necessary to meet the recipient's "living
expense need."

In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App.

1990), this Court stated:
It is questionable from the record that this is a
case warranting alimony in favor of defendant,
whose substantial accumulated wealth and monthly
income should permit her a standard of living
comparable to what she enjoyed during the marriage.
Rather, alimony was the device the court selected
to narrow the gap between the parties7 incomes.
Especially since nearly all income at issue in this
case is simply the return on property interests,
the court's approach was incorrect.
Proper
distribution of property interests of one sort or
another should have come first, and only then would
alimony need to be considered.
Burt, 799 P.2d at 1170, n.3. Accord DuBois v. DuBois, 29 Utah
2d

75, 504 P. 2d

1380, 1381

(1973)

(trial court

abused

discretion in awarding alimony where "it appears that the
income from the assets awarded to the plaintiff is sufficient
2

In Martinez, the wife had made substantial sacrifices to
enable her husband to finish medical school, but the parties
divorced before they could enjoy the higher standard of living
permitted by his degree. Martinez, 818 P. 2d at 539. Because of
this, the Supreme Court stated that "it may be appropriate" for the
trial court to make a "compensating adjustment."
Id.
In the
present case, where significant property had accumulated during the
marriage and Erin had enjoyed a comfortable standard of living for
many years, she has already shared in the economic benefits that
have actually been realized. See Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1081.
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to maintain her lifestyle in the manner to which she is
accustomed without periodic payments from defendant") ; Jeppson
v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984) (alimony terminated
where plaintiff's ability to perform some work plus assets
available to her were sufficient to support her need).
Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585 (Utah App. 1993) , which
cites Chambers, does not support
alimony.

Erin's claim

for more

It stands for the proposition that an alimony award

should maintain the receiving spouse "at a level as close as
possible

to that

marriage."

standard

of

living enjoyed

Godfrey, 854 P.2d at 589.

during the

There is more than

adequate support in the record for the trial court's finding
that Erin "has need of about $7,000.00 to maintain her prior
standard of living."

R.O.A. 923-926.

The trial court's

alimony award will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has
been "a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion." Id. Erin
has not shown that the trial court has abused its discretion
in setting the alimony at $7,000 per month for the first three
years and reducing it to $3,000 per month thereafter.3
III. Attorneys' Fees Cannot be Awarded Because There is no
Finding of Need.
On remand, in determining whether Erin had the ability to
pay her own attorneys' fees, the trial court found: "It is
3

There is no basis for Erin's claim that the child support
should have been increased when the alimony was decreased.
Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 25. The children's expenses
erroneously included in the alimony award totalled approximately
$4,783.36 per month. However, the parties stipulated to child
support of $4,500.00 per month.
15

clear with the distribution of almost a million and a half
dollars in assets, that the plaintiff could pay her own
attorney." R.O.A. 735-736; 928, 930. Nevertheless, the court
ordered Tom to pay some of Erin's attorneys' fees because it
believed that taxes, family loans, and legal expenses would
make "substantial inroads" into that investment base. In his
opening brief, Tom has established that there is no evidence
that the family loans were uncollectible.

Erin does not

contest this. Erin also concedes that the taxes were already
taken

into

consideration

by Mr. Abold,

the

expert

who

testified about Erin's investment base and calculated her
investment income.

Similarly, Erin fails to point to any

evidence in the record which would support the trial court's
conclusion that Erin's legal expenses would substantially
erode her investment base.
Erin likes to remind the Court that Tom's post-decree
monthly income is "several times" greater than Erin's. Tom's
income is irrelevant to a determination of Erin's ability to
pay.

In this case, the court found that Erin did have the

ability to pay her own attorneys' fees. It was error for the
court to order Tom to pay part of Erin's fees despite its
finding of no need.
In this appeal, as in the first appeal (see Appellant's
Brief, dated 11/7/91, at 39-41), Erin argues that the trial
court erred in awarding her only a partial reimbursement of
her attorneys' fees. See Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at
16

42-43.

That issue was disposed of in the first appeal.

Furthermore, it is within the court's discretion to award less
than the claimed amount of fees, as long as it has "reasonable
justification."
1991).

Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App.

Contrary to Erin's assertion, the trial court did

justify only a partial award of attorneys' fees.

In the

Decree and in the Order on Remand, the court stated that ^Erin
could pay her own attorneys' fees in light of the million and
a half dollars in assets she received.
IV.

R.O.A. 396, 928, 930.

There is no Reason for an Evidentiary Hearing.
Erin has asked this Court to remand this case with

directions to the trial court
adequately

address

the needs

"to conduct a hearing to
and

circumstances

of Mrs.

Chambers and to fashion an alimony award that would provide
her a true and equitable standard of living." Appellee/CrossAppellant's Brief at 43.
trial.

In other words, Erin wants a new

She wants an opportunity to re-write Exhibit 11 to

include more expenses, and she wants an opportunity to argue
once again what she argued at trial and argued in the first
appeal — that she should have received a larger alimony award
because she was not awarded part of Tom's future contract
earnings.

See Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 28, 30.

Erin also wants an opportunity to put on evidence of her
"true" investment base. See Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief
at 33. Of course, at trial Erin could have presented her own
evidence to contradict or supplement Mr. Abold's testimony
17

regarding her investment base and income, but she did not do
so.

In addition, she wants a chance to re-do the attorneys'

fees affidavit presented at trial. Id. The parties had their
trial.

Erin is not entitled to re-try these matters in a so-

called "evidentiary hearing" on remand.
At the June 7, 1993, hearing Erin raised these same
issues regarding the future contract earnings, investment
base, and attorneys' fees, and she requested an evidentiary
hearing.

The trial court stated:

I don't see the necessity for the retrial of the
case.
I think that the Court has heard the
evidence and the record is available to me. And I
believe that the Court is able to follow the
directions of the Court of Appeals in handing down
a new Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decree, relating specifically to the three issues:
alimony, attorneys' fees and the division of the
retirement.
Hr. (6/7/93) at 54-55. The trial record was adequate for the
trial court to follow this Court's mandate in the first
appeal.

Nothing has changed in that respect.

There is no

basis for this Court to order an evidentiary hearing.
V.

Erin Should Not be Awarded Attorneys' Fees on Appeal.
Tom opposes Erin's request for attorneys' fees on appeal.

If Tom prevails on the main issues in this appeal, Erin's
attorneys' fees request must be denied.

See e.g. , Hall v.

Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1027 (Utah App. 1993).

Even if Erin

substantially prevails in this appeal, she should not be
awarded

attorneys' fees because

financial

assistance

and

she
18

she

was

is not

only

in need of

granted

partial

attorneys7 fees at trial. See Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 967
(Utah App. 1994); Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah
App. 1992).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Tom requests that the
Order on Remand be reversed in part, with the following
instructions on remand:

(1) that the trial court be directed

to order Erin to reimburse Tom for overpayments of alimony in
the amount of $108,000 plus interest; (2) that the trial court
be directed

to reinstate

its original order terminating

alimony payments after six years; and (3) that the trial court
be directed to reverse its award of attorneys' fees to Erin
and order Erin to reimburse Tom for previous payments in the
amount of $22,500 plus interest.

In all other respects, the

Order on Remand and the Decree should be affirmed.

In

addition, Erin's request for attorneys' fees on appeal should
be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /pday

of October, 1994.
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